The impact of commercial aviation on naval aviation by Imhoff, Patrick J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-06
The impact of commercial aviation on naval aviation
Imhoff, Patrick J.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









Thesis Advisor:  Amilcar Menichini 
Second Reader: Robert Eger 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
THE IMPACT OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION ON NAVAL AVIATION 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Patrick J. Imhoff 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
For the first time in over 15 years, commercial airlines are hiring large numbers of pilots and 
threatening retention rates for naval aviation. One major concern for Navy leadership is if there is a major 
difference in compensation for aviators who transition to the airlines after 10 years when compared to 
aviators who make that transition after retirement. The other concern is how the new blended retirement 
plan will impact compensation and ultimately retention.   
Using net present value, this research discounted career earnings back to the point at which a naval 
aviator chooses to stay in the service or seek commercial employment. It was revealed that aviators who 
decide to leave the service after 10 years stand to earn significantly more money than those who remain 
until retirement.   
Aviation Career Continuation Pay was analyzed and alternate payment plans were studied to provide 
options for the Navy to shrink the gap in compensation. Ultimately, if the Navy is willing to spend more 




14. SUBJECT TERMS  
naval aviation, commercial aviation, aviation career continuation pay, military retirement 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
81 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION ON NAVAL AVIATION 
 
 
Patrick J. Imhoff 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 





















Donald Summers, Ph.D. 
Academic Associate,  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 




For the first time in over 15 years, commercial airlines are hiring large numbers of 
pilots and threatening retention rates for naval aviation. One major concern for Navy 
leadership is if there is a major difference in compensation for aviators who transition to 
the airlines after 10 years when compared to aviators who make that transition after 
retirement. The other concern is how the new blended retirement plan will impact 
compensation and ultimately retention.   
Using net present value, this research discounted career earnings back to the point 
at which a naval aviator chooses to stay in the service or seek commercial employment. It 
was revealed that aviators who decide to leave the service after 10 years stand to earn 
significantly more money than those who remain until retirement.   
Aviation Career Continuation Pay was analyzed and alternate payment plans were 
studied to provide options for the Navy to shrink the gap in compensation. Ultimately, if 
the Navy is willing to spend more money on compensation, they can close the 
compensation gap and hopefully prevent future retention problems.   
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As the economy continues to improve following 2008’s recession, unemployment 
rates continue to fall and that concerns some senior members of the Navy. Vice Admiral 
Bill Moran, the Navy’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, 
Training and Education (N1) is concerned there may be a pending sailor exodus. He 
recently said “we’ve had historic retention levels for the last several years and with 
historic highs comes, at some point, a turn in the other direction. There are signs that we 
could be heading in that other direction” (LaGrone, 2014). Vice Admiral Moran verified 
that one group he is particularly worried about are naval aviators. As LaGrone pointed 
out, he is worried that recent patterns of airline hiring along with airline growth and 
expansion will negatively affect retention among aviators. 
The commercial airline industry appears to have confirmed VADM Moran’s 
worries. A recent study by Kent Lovelace, the chairman of the aviation department at the 
University of North Dakota revealed a projected shortfall of 35,000 pilots in the next 20 
years (Jansen, 2013). Some of the reasons listed by Jansen for the projected shortfall are 
increases in the required training of pilots, extended rest periods, and a mandatory 
retirement age of 65.1 
According to Jansen, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated 
increased training in 2013; co-pilots were now required to complete a minimum of 1,500 
flight hours, rather than the previous 250-hour requirement. This new requirement, 
Jansen indicated, discouraged civilian students hoping to pursue airline careers, whose 
potential flight school loans were already upwards of $100,000, with first-year officer 
salaries ranging only between $20,000 and $50,000. While the FAA increased the 
minimum hours to 1,500, however, they did not require that all applicants meet that 
standard. Military pilots are only required to have 750 hours, an accomplishment that 
                                                 
1 The retirement age was extended from 60 to 65 in 2007, which delayed this potential problem for 
five years. 
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almost every military pilot will reach well before they have the opportunity to separate 
from the service (Everstine, 2015).   
Leaving the military to join the airlines has always been an option for skilled 
naval aviators, but following September 11, 2001, the airlines stopped hiring at 
significant levels (Future and Active Pilot Advisors (FAPA), n.d.). According to FAPA, 
in 2001, civilian airlines hired 3,408 new pilots, yet from 2002 through 2004 new pilot 
hiring’s totaled 851, 854 and 1,199 respectively, a significant decrease. It was only in 
2014 that hiring’s jumped above 3,000 again as revealed by FAPA and that number 
appears to be trending upward. The airlines are now dealing with their own retention 
problems as over the next decade, anywhere from 1,000 to 2,000 senior captains are 
reaching the age of 65 and being forced to retire due to FAA regulations (Airline Pilot 
Central, n.d.). With the possible shortage of civilian aviation students, the military’s 
aviators are more than qualified to take over and the military must expect that some will 
look to make a change (Jansen, 2013). Not only can the airlines offer financial 
advantages over the military, there is also the fact that aviators who transition to the 
airlines can enjoy the benefits of a more stable home life that no longer requires moving 
around the country every three to four years. The airlines present the Navy with the 
potential for a major problem in retaining skilled aviators. This is a problem that needs to 
be addressed before it is too late. This thesis analyzes the differences in net present values 
(NPV) of potential career earnings for naval aviators who depart the service after 
completing the active duty service obligation (ADSO) (roughly 10 years of service time) 
and those aviators who depart the service after serving for 20 years, the traditional 
retirement point. 
Not only do the NPV calculations consider two different exit points from the 
Navy, they also consider two different retirement systems. On January 1, 2018, the 
military’s new blended retirement system will become operational. Top officials who 
monitor retention rates must now take into account how an aviator’s new retirement plan 
may influence his or her financial incentives and changes. 
While this study focuses on financial differences, it is important to remember that 
money is not the only factor that influences retention among naval aviators. Other 
 3 
factors—such as family life, spouse employment opportunities, repeated cross-country 
moves, military bureaucracy and lack of flying opportunities as naval aviation careers 
progress—influence an aviator’s decision to remain in the service or seek employment 
with the airlines. This study does not cover these topics and thus does not provide a 
perfect solution to counter airlines that may aggressively target military pilots as potential 
hires. What this thesis does provide is the financial facts to ensure that any discussion 
about retention and potential solutions will have a solid foundation in finance. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer three main questions regarding naval aviation and 
commercial aviation: 
1. Do naval aviators earn more money by transitioning to the commercial 
airlines after serving for 20 years or after serving until completion of their 
initial service obligation? 
2. Will the implementation of the new retirement plan change the results 
from the first question? 
3. If the Navy makes major changes to aviation career continuation pay 
(ACCP), will it impact the results from the first question? 
C. ORGANIZATION 
The rest of this thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter II provides the 
background information necessary to understand the specifics behind a career in naval 
aviation and a career in the commercial airline industry. Chapter III explains the 
methodology behind the NPV calculations as well as the assumptions that were made 
regarding the inputs to the equations. Chapter IV shows the results of the calculations 
along with the sensitivity analysis that was conducted to determine the impact that 
change could make on some of the variables. Chapter V draws conclusions from data and 
makes recommendations for further study and research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. CAREER EARNINGS 
1. Naval Aviation 
All members of the military are compensated financially for their service to their 
country. The military’s compensation system is designed to be fair and competitive both 
internally with the services and with respect to the civilian sector (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). Aviators are compensated in the 
form of basic pay, special and incentive pay, allowances and retirement, according to the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness. When all elements are 
combined an aviator can determine their Total Military Compensation (TMC). Each 
element of an aviator’s TMC is discussed in detail in this chapter. 
a. Basic Pay 
Basic pay is the most fundamental part of the military pay system and it also 
makes up the largest portion of an aviator’s TMC (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). How much basic pay an aviator receives is a 
function of their rank and their time in service. Those two inputs can be used to enter the 
standard pay tables for all officers to determine their monthly basic pay. Members of the 
military are entitled to annual pay raises which results in new pay tables being released at 
the beginning of every calendar year (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel Readiness, n.d.). According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel Readiness, pay raises are supposed to be based upon the Employment Cost 
Index (ECI). “The Employment Cost Index (ECI) measures the change in the cost of 
labor, free from the influence of employment shifts among occupations and industries” 
(United States Department of Labor, 2016). “The FY2000 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) directed that pay raises for 2000 through 2006 would 
automatically be one-half percent above the private-sector wage increases. Pay raises 
beginning in 2007 are equal to the increase in the ECI” (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). Congress set the pay raises above private-sector 
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wages from 2000 to 2006 to make up for several years of the military pay scale lagging 
behind the civilian sector. Despite the specific language written in the FY2000 NDAA, 
Congress and the president are not required to follow this rule if they believe it is fiscally 
prudent to approve a different (higher or lower) pay raise(Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). Figure 1 shows how the military’s pay raises 
have compared to the civilian sector in recent years. 
 
ECI increase is always the bar shown on the left in each year grouping. 
Figure 1.  Difference between military pay raises and ECI increases since 
1996. Source: Hoff & Meizlish (2015). 
b. Basic Allowance for Housing 
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is a non-taxed allowance that is designed to 
offset the cost of housing for military members not living in government-provided 
quarters (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). 
According to defense policy, BAH amount depends on a member’s geographical location 
and rank and whether or not he or she has dependents. BAH rates are a direct reflection 
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of the cost of rental properties in different geographical areas and therefore members 
receive higher rates in more expensive places like San Diego or Washington, DC, when 
compared to places like Pensacola. BAH rates will fluctuate as economic conditions shift 
in an area and the rental market changes. Members currently living in a given area will 
benefit from rates increasing but will not be affected if rates drop (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). 
c. Basic Allowance for Subsistence 
Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) is provided to offset the costs of meals. 
Its origins can be traced back to when the military provided room and board (rations) to 
its members (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). 
Defense policy stipulates BAS is only designed to offset the cost for the member and not 
their dependents if he or she has them. The rate offered for BAS is linked to the cost of 
food according to the government’s policy. Each year BAS is adjusted by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s food cost index in relation to the change in the price of food. 
As of 2016, BAS for officers is $253.63 per month. Since BAS is considered an 
allowance, it is not taxed by the government (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). 
d. Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) is what is commonly referred to as “flight 
pay.” Title 37, Chapter 5 U.S.C. § 301a is the legislation that provides ACIP for aviators 
as a financial incentive for officers to serve as aviators throughout a military career. 
Payments start once aviators actually begin to fly and log flight hours which occurs for 
the first time while at primary flight training. ACIP is only based on years of aviation 
service and not by rank (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
Readiness, n.d.). Table 1 reflects the designated rates at which eligible aviators are payed. 
It is important to note that ACIP is considered taxable income and it is not increased 
yearly for inflation. 
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Table 1.   ACIP rates for aviators. Adapted from Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (2010) 
Years of Aviation Service as an Officer 
2 or less Over 2 Over 3 Over 4 Over 6 











$840 $585 $495 $385 $250 
 
For aviators to ensure they continue to receive ACIP they must meet certain 
aviation gates. Aviators who have an Aviation Service Entry Date (ASED) after October 
2, 1985 “must have performed at least 8 years of operational flying (96 MOF) within the 
first 12 years of aviation service for entitlement to continuous ACIP until the next gate at 
18 years of aviation service” (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2010, p. 4). It is 
safe to assume that those aviators who successfully screen for aviation department head 
(DH) will receive continuous ACIP up to the 18-year gate at a minimum. 
e. Aviation Career Continuation Pay 
Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) is what aviators commonly refer to as 
“the bonus.” It was designed to be a retention tool to ensure highly skilled and 
experienced aviators remained on active duty to support the Navy’s mission and maintain 
combat readiness (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2005). In this section, ACCP 
is analyzed strictly as a form of compensation in order to correctly calculate an aviator’s 
career earnings. The way the Navy utilizes ACCP as a retention tool is analyzed in a 
future section. The contract amounts described in Table 2 are the historical values that 
have been offered. From FY 99–10 all pilots received the same amount regardless of 
community, however, in FY 11, the Navy began to adjust the bonus amounts based upon 
specific community health (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs), 2015). 
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Table 2.   Historical ACCP rates for aviators. Adapted from Office of the 




The military’s retirement system is likely a major factor to be considered for 
aviators weighing the decision to remain in the service following their ADSO. The 
military’s retirement plan has remained relatively unchanged over the past couple 
decades but in 2015, Congress approved a new format based upon recommendations 
from the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC). 
The new retirement plan will go into effect January 1, 2018, however aviators currently 
in the service will be grandfathered into the current system unless they desire to switch 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). For this reason, 
both systems have been briefly analyzed for computing TMC. 
While the current pension type retirement plan has three variations (Final Pay, 
High-36 and CBS/REDUX), only High-36 is applicable to this study (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). Final Pay is not applicable because it 
only applies to aviators who entered the service before September 8, 1980, according to 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, while 
CBS/REDUX is assumed to be a poor financial decision.2 Only aviators who serve a 
minimum of 20 years are eligible for the High-36 pension. The payout is determined by 
multiplying the average of the aviator’s highest three years of base pay times a multiple. 
The multiple is determined by multiplying 2.5 percent times the years of service. This 
                                                 
2 CBS/REDUX offers eligible members a $30,000 bonus at year 15 of service but reduces the pension 
multiplier by one percentage point for each year less than 30 years at retirement. This study assumes 
aviators serve no more than 20 years, which cuts the pension from 50% to 40%. 
FY 99-10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15
HM Pilot 125,000.00$ 50,000.00$   50,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   
HSC Pilot 125,000.00$ 50,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   
HSL/HSM Pilot 125,000.00$ 50,000.00$   25,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   
VAQ Pilot 125,000.00$ 75,000.00$   125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 
VAW/VRC Pilot 125,000.00$ 25,000.00$   50,000.00$   100,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 
VFA Pilot 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 125,000.00$ 
VP(P) Pilot 125,000.00$ 50,000.00$   50,000.00$   50,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   
VQ(P) Pilot 125,000.00$ 50,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   
VQ(T) Pilot 125,000.00$ 25,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   75,000.00$   
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forms the basis for the pension the aviator will receive after he or she retires. The pension 
is adjusted for inflation by Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA) based upon the 
Consumer Price Index (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
Readiness, n.d.). 
While the current retirement system is a Defined Benefit (DB) pension plan, the 
new system will be a Blended Retirement System. One of the main benefits of the new 
blended plan is that all aviators will receive benefits, not just those that serve for 20 years 
of more.3 The new system is comprised of three components: Defined Contributions 
(DC), Defined Benefits (DB) and Continuation Pay (CP). 
• For DCs, aviators will automatically be enrolled in the Thrift Saving Plan 
(TSP) with three percent of their basic pay going into the Roth type 
account. Only after the completion of financial literacy training can the 
member change the contribution amount or change the TSP account to a 
traditional type. Department of Defense (DOD) will contribute one percent 
of basic pay every month, vesting upon completion of two years of 
service. In addition, after four years of service, DOD will match up to five 
percent of basic pay in the TSP account (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2015). 
• A DB annuity or pension is available for aviators who make it to 20 years 
of service with the difference being a two percent multiplier for all and a 
reduction to COLA less one percent for those who entered the service 
before January 1, 2014 (Office of Management and Budget, 2015). 
• In response to potential retention impacts, aviators may be offered CP, 
which is a one-time retention payment determined by the individual 
services up to 22 times basic pay at 12 years of service (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2015). 
2. Commercial Aviation 
The commercial airline industry is broken up into several different segments to 
include legacy, major, regional, and cargo (Airline Pilot Central, n.d.). Airlines that are in 
the legacy category pay their pilots the most and for that reason they were the main focus 
                                                 
3 Under the current DB retirement system, only about 17% of active duty service members receive 
retirement benefits (Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, 2015). 
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of the study.4 The only major airline that can compete with the legacy airlines with 
respect to compensation is Southwest which justifies their inclusion in the study. In the 
cargo category, both FedEx and UPS are very similar with respect to financial 
compensation therefore only FedEx has been studied. No airlines from the regional 
category were analyzed because these airlines simply do not compensate their pilots well 
enough to be competitive with respect to this study.5 The commercial airline industry 
compensates pilots in three main ways. These include hourly wages, retirement funds and 
profit sharing (Airline Pilot Central, 2006). 
a. Base Pay 
Unlike the military, the airlines do not pay their pilots a salary but instead pay 
them by the hour (Airline Pilot Central, 2006). There are two main inputs that determine 
the hourly wage of an airline pilot according to Airline Pilot Central. The first is the type 
of plane they fly. Airplanes are typically considered to be wide-body or narrow-body and 
pilots get paid more to fly a wide-bodied plane. The second is the position on the crew 
they hold, either captain or first officer (FO). New pilots start out as FOs and work their 
way up to captains if they desire. All of the FOs and captains are ranked by seniority to 
determine assignments (Airline Pilot Central, n.d.). The more senior pilots will get to be 
based out of the city they want and get to fly the specific routes they want which will 
prove to be very beneficial to their quality of life. 
It is important to understand that the hourly pay rate is not based on the actual 
number of hours they work but the number of hours they fly. An airline pilot is not 
actually compensated for the hours they spend on the ground while the airplane is being 
pre-flighted and passengers and cargo are being loaded (Airline Pilot Central, 2006). 
During this time they are clearly working yet they are not compensated. Their 
compensation begins when the boarding door is closed and they begin to taxi and it ends 
                                                 
4 The legacy airlines include Delta, United, American, Alaska and Hawaiian airlines (Airline Pilot 
Central, n.d.).  
5 Corvus Airlines was the best paying regional airline in 2015 and 2014. On average, their pilots were 
paid $106 and $97.25 respectively, almost half of the $203.50 hourly wage Southwest pilots receive 
(Airline Pilot Central, 2015). 
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when the flight is completed and they are back at the boarding gate. This type of system 
can result in two pilots both spending the same number of hours at work but each being 
paid for a different number of hours. For example, if a pilot shows up one hour before 
takeoff, flies 13 hours non-stop and then spends one more hour at work before going 
home, he or she will be paid for 13 hours of work despite spending 15 hours at work. 
Another pilot may show up one hour before takeoff, fly five hours to a layover 
destination, spend two hours on the ground and then fly six hours back to the origin and 
spend one hour at work before departing. This pilot would be paid for 11 hours despite 
spending 15 hours at work. This makes it much more advantageous for pilots to be 
assigned longer flights and that comes with seniority (Airline Pilot Central, 2006). Tables 
3 and 4 show the average hourly wages pilots earned in 2015. 
Table 3.   Average hourly pay for pilots working for legacy carriers. Source: 
Airline Pilot Central (2015). 
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Table 4.   Average hourly pay for pilots working for major carriers. Source: 
Airline Pilot Central (2015). 
 
 
The amount of time it takes for a FO to promote to captain can vary at each airline 
and some pilots may chose to remain FOs because they would rather be a senior FO than 
a junior captain (AvJobs, n.d.). This means they will earn less but they will have the 
advantage of getting top pick on routes and home locations over the other FOs instead of 
getting the least desirable routes and locations as a junior captain.   
Every major airline has a union that represents the pilots (Union Facts, 2014). 
These unions are supposed to look out for the best interest of the pilots though this can 
vary from person to person. One of the main benefits of unions as listed by Union Facts is 
that they protect and defend pilots from any type of behavior by the airline that is deemed 
to be unjust. Almost all pilots join the union after they are hired. In 2013 according to 
Union Facts, there were over 48,551 members in the pilots union. The cost of this 
membership is 1.95 percent of their income each year which can add up as pilots gain 
seniority and thus it must be accounted for when calculating their compensation (Union 
Facts, 2014). 
b. Retirement 
Historically, the airlines have offered two types of retirement plan, the A plan and 
the B plan (Airline Pilot Central, 2007). As described by Airline Pilot Central, the A plan 
is a defined benefit pension plan meaning that when pilots retired they would receive a 
pension for the rest of their lives. FedEx and UPS, both cargo carriers, are the only two 
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airlines that still offer these types of plans. Airline Pilot Central describes B plans, more 
specifically called Money Purchase Pension Plans, as a defined contribution type of plan. 
All the legacy airlines offer a B type plan to include FedEx and UPS as their pilots 
receive both types of retirement plans (Airline Pilot Central, 2007).   
The A plan uses a set percentage and a maximum number of years to define what 
a pilot can expect to receive in benefits when they retire (Airline Pilot Central, 2007). For 
example, FedEx sets their percentage at two percent and the maximum number of years 
at 25. This means a pilot who works at FedEx can expect to receive 50 percent (two 
percent time 25 years) of their high five years pay. These plans are usually capped at an 
upper limit and FedEx set its limit for the maximum pay at $260,000 which means the 
most a pilot can expect to receive in defined benefits is $130,000.6 UPS offers a similar 
plan yet uses different percentages. 
The more common B plan is what most airline pilots can expect to receive in 
retirement (Airline Pilot Central, 2007). The B plan is similar to a 401k that allows 
contributions to be made by both the pilots and their employers. Each airline manages the 
B plan differently. According to Airline Pilot Central, some airlines will make an 
automatic contribution based on a set percentage of the pilots pay without requiring the 
pilot to make any contributions at all. Even though they are not required to make 
contributions, pilots are able to make contributions if they desire.7 Financially, this is the 
most rewarding plan as the pilot gets to keep their whole pay check and at the same time 
receive retirement benefits. The other type of B plans described by Airline Pilot Central 
requires the pilot to make a contribution first and then the airline will match it up to a 
certain preset percentage. In all of the B plans offered by the airlines, the pilots are vested 
immediately (Airline Pilot Central, 2007). 
                                                 
6 Specifics regarding FedEx’s A plan were communicated via email from former military pilot now 
employed by FedEx as a first officer. 
7 The IRS limits the maximum amount of direct contribution plans to $53,000 and employer 
contributions are limited to a maximum salary of $265,000 (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). 
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c. Profit Sharing 
Profit sharing is a type of bonus that pilots can earn when the airline they work for 
hits a certain benchmark in profits for the year. Many of these benchmarks are tiered 
meaning pilots will earn increasing percentages as profits hit higher and higher 
benchmarks (McIntyre, 2015). Profit sharing can be a hot topic when it is time for the 
airlines to renew their contracts with the pilot unions. The issue with profit sharing is that 
when the economy is good, pilots are compensated with very large bonuses. When the 
economy is down, airlines do not generate as much net income and profits which results 
in smaller profit sharing bonuses for the pilots. This variability, according to McIntrye, 
makes it difficult for pilots to be able to accurately project future earnings but many 
pilots prefer higher profit sharing rates instead of higher hourly wages and lower profit 
sharing rates. Delta recently paid out $1.1 billion in profit sharing to its employees with 
each person earning a bonus of about 16 percent of their annual compensation, roughly 
two months’ pay (Zhang, 2015). Delta also recently proposed a new labor contract that 
would offer a pay increase of 14.5 percent along with an increase in 401k contributions 
but it would lower the profit sharing rates. The pilots rejected the contract proving how 
much they value the potential for earning very large bonuses when the companies are 
profitable which many are proving to be (McIntyre, 2015). 
B. NAVAL AVIATION RETENTION 
1. Historical Trends  
In 2008, N10, the Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPTE) 
Resource Management Division sponsored CNA to conduct a study on officer retention, 
particularly aviators with 7 to 12 years of commissioned service, the critical stay or leave 
time frame (Daly et al., 2008). In their study, they determined that not all aviation 
communities were recording retention data the same way which resulted in non-standard 
data being sent to higher authorities. The end result of the study was a standardized way 
for communities to report cumulative continuation rates (CCR). The resulting CCRs are 
used to give senior members of the military a better understanding of the health of each 
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community and if changes need to be made. Table 5 shows the historical CCRs for 
aviation as a whole as well as for each community. 
 
 17 
Table 5.   Historical aviation CCRs. Adapted from NPC PM, personal communication, March 2016. 
 
 




QUAL PILOTS 25.7% 38.7% 30.9% 36.3% 48.7% 52.8% 44.6% 42.9% 46.2% 42.2% 52.8% 49.1% 52.5% 67.5% 55.2% 50.4% 43.9%
JET PILOTS 27.8% 41.0% 27.6% 32.7% 61.5% 56.0% 45.6% 46.6% 43.5% 45.7% 54.8% 56.8% 59.8% 68.9% 55.9% 52.6% 46.4%
VFA (F/A-18) 32.0% 41.6% 28.3% 42.2% 70.9% 65.8% 51.9% 56.4% 48.8% 47.4% 58.1% 63.5% 66.2% 69.2% 57.7% 56.9% 46.9%
Q (EA-6B, EA-18G) 48.1% 38.7% 39.9% 45.7% 75.0% 62.2% 52.5% 51.4% 35.6% 56.3% 55.8% 55.9% 65.6% 65.6% 68.6% 56.9% 43.1%
VAW (E-2C) 15.0% 40.5% 28.3% 13.0% 35.0% 37.1% 47.5% 42.8% 47.4% 47.3% 44.8% 39.1% 44.3% 66.9% 45.8% 40.7% 46.3%
PROP PILOTS 15.3% 31.8% 16.3% 19.3% 30.6% 39.2% 29.0% 24.0% 39.0% 30.1% 37.2% 38.2% 44.4% 62.4% 44.7% 50.1% 35.2%
VP (P-3) 14.9% 30.9% 15.8% 21.6% 29.0% 37.8% 27.4% 22.4% 33.9% 30.0% 36.1% 37.6% 43.2% 62.9% 47.9% 47.7% 35.1%
VQ PROP (EP-3) 14.2% 22.0% 16.7% 15.4% 32.1% 44.0% 36.7% 35.2% 68.5% 23.2% 41.8% 38.1% 42.8% 65.2% 49.7% 49.1% 20.9%
VQ TAC (E-6A/B) 12.5% 38.5% 19.2% 10.2% 32.4% 39.6% 29.6% 16.8% 44.9% 37.7% 40.6% 39.2% 48.2% 56.8% 25.8% 72.2% 55.4%
HELO PILOTS 30.6% 39.0% 43.0% 46.3% 43.0% 59.2% 59.0% 51.2% 47.6% 44.6% 56.3% 53.0% 53.5% 69.9% 60.0% 49.3% 47.1%
HSL/HSM (H-60) 29.3% 35.8% 42.1% 49.0% 44.6% 58.7% 56.5% 58.6% 52.0% 42.7% 63.0% 51.1% 52.9% 72.5% 67.1% 46.0% 49.6%
  H-60, H-46, H-53) 30.2% 45.5% 43.9% 45.3% 39.8% 57.4% 62.3% 44.2% 44.4% 47.7% 48.2% 53.1% 52.7% 66.2% 55.9% 49.0% 44.2%
HM (H-53) 28.5% 20.9% 50.0% 21.5% 30.0% 51.9% 54.7% 64.2% 36.6% 36.5% 51.4% 62.3% 58.6% 74.1% 40.0% 49.9% 34.6%
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2. Airline Hiring Trends 
When the historical naval aviation CCRs are converted from retention rates to 
attrition rates, there is the appearance of a relationship between them and airline pilot 
hiring trends as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  A comparison of Navy pilot attrition rates versus airline hiring rates. 
Adapted from Future and Active Pilot Advisors (n.d.). 
In 2014, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study to 
analyze the projected shortage of commercial airline pilots. GAO looked at four different 
studies that suggested the need for an average of a few thousand new pilots per year over 
the next decade. The following are the studies and projections GAO analyzed: 
• Audries Aircraft Analysis: Their pilot demand forecast was based on 
aircraft manufacturers’ forecasts of fleet growth. Embraer’s forecast 
projected about 2,900 new pilots per year, Airbus projected 3,900 new 
pilots per year and Boeing projected 3,300 new pilots. 
• University of North Dakota Academic Study: Their study focused on 
growth, both positive and negative as its basis. Positives were overall 
growth of the airline industry and negatives were pilot retirements and 
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attrition. The study estimated 95,000 new pilots would be required over 
the next 20 years, with about 45,000 over the next decade (4,500 per year). 
• FAA 2013 Forecast: Their forecast was based on projected passenger 
demand with an expected growth of 2.2 percent per year through 2033. 
This type of growth would require 70,000 new pilots through 2032, which 
equals an average of 3,400 new pilots per year over the next decade. 
• Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Projections 2012–2022: Their 
study was focused on expected occupational growth. Based on 
employment projections, they calculated that an average of 440 pilot jobs 
would be lost annually through 2022, however, during that same time 
period there would be 19,200 job openings, an average of 1,920 per year 
due to retirements and attrition.   
From the four studies’ results, the GAO estimated the range of new pilots required to be 
between 1,900 and 4,500 (Government Accountability Office, 2014). Table 6 shows how 
many pilots will be required to retire each year for the next decade if the mandatory 
retirement age remains at 65. 
Table 6.   Future mandatory retirements by major airlines. Adapted from 
Airline Pilot Central (n.d.). 
 
 
3. ACCP As a Retention Tool 
ACCP was implemented in order to retain aviation trained officers who are 
required to support the Navy’s mission and maintain combat readiness (Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, 2005). The Navy realized that training aviators requires 
extensive time and resources and therefore demands that retention of them be a top 
priority. ACCP is governed by congressional legislation and U.S. Navy instruction. Title 
Year Delta United American FedEx Total
2016 225 371 135 149 880
2017 286 431 190 186 1093
2018 415 413 300 184 1312
2019 513 424 418 150 1505
2020 602 427 535 180 1744
2021 789 509 580 208 2086
2022 851 470 647 211 2179
2023 809 552 704 223 2288
2024 805 491 717 229 2242
2025 713 600 713 218 2244
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37 U.S.C. §301b authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to pay aviation officers a 
maximum retention bonus of $25,000 per year if the aviation officer meets the following 
criteria: 
• is entitled to ACIP; 
• is in a pay grade below O-7; 
• is qualified to perform operational flying duty; and 
• has completed any active duty service commitment for undergraduate 
aviator training or is within one year of completing such commitment. 
(U.S. Congress, 2016) 
The Navy follows congressional guidance as well as their own instruction, 
OPNAV Instruction 7220.9 for matters concerning ACCP. This instruction gives the 
Commanders, Navy Personnel Command, Aviation Officer Assignments Branch (PERS-
43) the ability to evaluate, accept, and administer all ACCP contracts assuming the 
contracts meet all congressional requirements defined above and the following: 
• is not subject to mandatory separation from active service within one year 
from the date ACCP would be paid; 
• has not twice failed to select for promotion to the next higher pay grade, 
unless selected for continuation; 
• if, having transitioned from Naval Flight Officer (NFO) to pilot, has 
completed the service obligation incurred during pilot training; and 
• is recommended for ACCP by his or her Commanding Officer. (Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, 2005) 
Every year the Navy releases a Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) 
discussing the specifics of the ACCP for that year. The message defines candidate 
eligibility, the dollar amounts being offered per community, how to apply, and when 
applications are due. Each Aviator has a two-year window in which they are eligible to 
apply for ACCP (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs), 2015). 
The first year they are eligible is called the early eligibility period (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 2015). Aviators hit this 
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period when they are in the fiscal year prior to the expiration of their service obligation. 
If they apply for and are accepted they will receive the bonus amount listed in the 
NAVADMIN in six annual installments. They will also incur a five-year service 
obligation beginning when they have completed their initial obligation and they also 
consent to being screened for DH and to accept DH orders if they are selected (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 2015). 
The second year they are eligible is called the initial eligibility period (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 2015). Aviators hit this 
period when they are in the fiscal year following the expiration of their initial service 
obligation. If they apply for and are accepted they will receive the bonus listed in the 
NAVADMIN in five annual installments. They will also incur a five-year obligation from 
the time their ACCP application is approved by PER-43 and they consent to being 
screened for DH and to accept DH orders if they are selected (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 2015). 
One of the unique factors of the ACCP program is that as long is an aviator meets 
the eligibility requirements previously defined their application will be accepted and they 
will begin receiving annual bonus payments (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). Bonus payments will stop however if an aviator fails to 
select for promotion to O-4 or fails to screen for DH. The Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel Readiness lists other reasons that payments can stop but these 
are the two most common ones. In the event payments stop, aviators are still entitled to 
keep what they have already been paid by the Navy. This usually leads to the Navy 
paying out more than is required to fulfill annual DH requirements (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, n.d.). 
Currently, the Navy has projected that aviation DH requirements for both 
operational and training squadrons will be approximately 330 pilots and NFOs through 
FY-18 (Kelso, 2014). During the FY-16 DH board, there were 447 eligible aviators 
competing for 300 total DH slots (Navy Personnel Command, 2015). This means that 147 
aviators were receiving bonus payments and were not selected. Due to timing, a majority 
of them will have received two payments already and some possibly three payments. In 
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FY 13, the Navy spent $5,325,000 in bonus payments on aviators (pilots and NFOs) who 
were either not selected for O-4 or not selected for DH (Kelso, 2014). The average 
amount the Navy pays is nearly $4.5 million in ACCP to retain aviators who will not 
complete DH tours; this is money the Navy could spend to compensate aviators and help 
to prevent possible retention issues. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This chapter explains how each calculation was performed and the reasons behind 
the choice. It also explains what each variable represents in the calculations along with all 
the assumptions that were made and the justifications behind them.   
A. METHODOLOGY 
When comparing career earnings for Navy pilots and airline pilots, values are 
spread across several years and must be accounted for accurately. Money is not valued 
the same in future years or past years. For these reasons the following calculations were 
used:  Present Value (PV), Future Value (FV) and NPV.   
1. Present Value and Future Value 
The PV and FV formulas are used in finance to calculate the present day value of 
any money that will be received in the future and the FV of money earned in the present. 
Financial managers explain this concept when they say “money has a time value or when 
they quote the most basic principle of finance:  a dollar today is worth more than a dollar 
tomorrow” (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). The time value concept means that a certain 
amount of money today is not worth the same amount at a future date, i.e., $100 today is 
not worth $100 in one year from now because of growth due to interest. Formulas are 
needed to quantify the differences between present money and future money. Thus, the 
following formulas are used to convert money between the present and the future:  
 
    
(Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011) 
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2. Net Present Value (NPV) 
“NPV is defined as the difference between the present value of cash inflows and 
the present value of cash outflows” (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). NPV is typically 
used as a finance tool to analyze profitability among different projected investment 
proposals. A positive NPV means a proposed project will be profitable and a negative 
NPV means it will lose money. This study is using NPV to determine which career path 
is most profitable by attempting to find the highest NPV.8 The following equation is used 
to calculate NPV:  
 
Ct = net cash inflow during the period t 
Co = total initial investment costs 
r = personal discount rate, and 
t = number of time periods  
(Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011) 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
This study required several assumptions to be made to complete calculations and 
develop solutions. All assumptions are explained in later chapters.  
1. Calculations 
The NPV calculations required assumptions to be made for return rates and 
discount rates.  
                                                 
8 NPVs are used in this study as a comparison tool, not an actual dollar amount expected to be earned. 
The value gained from the NPV equations will be in the difference between two NPVs, which will show 
how much more valuable one option is over the other. 
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a. Rate of Return 
When the new retirement plan goes into effect in 2018, one of the requirements in 
determining career compensation for naval aviators will be determining the value of the 
defined contributions made by the Navy. Defined contributions will utilize the TSP and 
will require a return rate to be estimated. In order to provide a reasonable return rate that 
approximates the historical S&P 500 return, the retirement commission used the TSP Life 
cycle 2050 Fund (L2050) along with its historical 7.3 percent average return (Military 
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, 2015). The Life cycle fund is 
spread across the G, F, C, S, and I Funds to provide diversification and is adjusted over 
time to meet changing risk profiles.9 When combined with the assumed 2.35 percent 
interest rate, the real rate of return is 4.95 percent according to the MCRMC. In 
agreement with the retirement commission, the L2050 Fund is used for the DC and CP 
portions of this thesis (Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization 
Commission, 2015). 
b. Personal Discount Rate 
Experimental and non-experimental studies have been done to measure the 
personal discount rate, which is the rate at which an individual will trade a current dollar 
for a future dollar. Included in these studies is an examination of the early 1990s military 
drawdown and the introduction of the Voluntary Separation Incentive and the Selective 
Separation Benefit (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). Warner and Pleeter evaluated the behavior 
of service members who were given a choice to have money in hand at the expense of 
their annuity. The results of the program were not what was expected as the “take rate” 
was far above the projected rate. 
The behavioral economic community has determined there are three elements to 
the personal discount rate (r): 
• Individuals do not discount all future values at the same rate 
                                                 
9 The G, F, C, S and I funds are specific TSP funds in which members can. The lifecycle fund makes 
investments into all of them much like a mutual fund does with individual stocks (Thrift Savings Plan, 
n.d.). 
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• r varies with the time delay of the reward or penalty 
• r varies with personal characteristics 
The MCRMC and RAND use a personal discount rate of 6.4 percent for officers. 
This assumption is accepted for the purpose of this study because the three elements used 
to determine the personal discount are assumed to be fairly consistent across the officer 
corps and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to treat every officer different.  
c. Inflation 
For the purposes of this thesis, the interest rate of 2.35 percent per year used by 
the MCRMC is assumed. 
2. Naval Aviator Compensation 
All naval aviators were assumed to start their careers in 2016 at the age of 22 and 
their compensation was based off of 2016 pay charts. All earnings were discounted back 
to the end of their 10th year of service which corresponds to an age of 32. This is the 
major decision point in a naval aviator’s career; they will either stay Navy or transition to 
the airlines. All future career earnings will be discounted back to this point for 
comparison purposes.  
a. Age and Life Expectancy 
Using the assumption that the majority of officers enter the military at age 22, the 
retirement age at the 20-year mark is 42 years old. The Office of the Actuary publishes 
gender specific life expectancy charts for enlisted and officer members that use 
retirement age as an independent variable (Office of the Actuary, 2015). 
Following the life expectancy chart for the assumed retirement ages and using a 
weighted average of the gender demographics of the enlisted and officer population 
within DOD yields the following: 
Officer:  (83.3% x 84.3yo)10 + (17.7% x 85.9yo)11 = 84.6 years old 
                                                 
10 Male officers 
11 Female officers 
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b. Promotions 
Navy Personnel Command’s (NPC) community brief for Aviation Officers charts 
an aviator’s career progression. This was used to determine at what point aviators would 
promote to O-4 and O-5 as shown in Table 7 (Navy Personnel Command, n.d.b). 
Table 7.   Naval aviators’ projected ranks over time. Adapted from Navy 
Personnel Command (n.d.b). 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Rank O-1 O-1 O-2 O-2 O-3 O-3 O-3 O-3 O-3 O-3 
Year 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Rank O-4 O-4 O-4 O-4 O-4 O-4 O-5 O-5 O-5 O-5 
 
c. Military Pay Raise 
There is not a predetermined rate for the military’s annual pay raise. From 2011 to 
2015, the average pay raise was 1.4 percent (Hoff & Meizlish, 2015). This number was 
used when applying a pay raise for future earnings. 
d. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) 
The BAH rate used in the calculations was based upon 2016 rates with 
dependents. While all aviators do not have dependents, using the dependent rate was the 
better of the two options because it showed the maximum potential dollar amount 
available when calculating the differences between career earnings for an aviator who 
serves until their initial obligation expires and one who serves until retirement. There is 
also not an exact way to average BAH across many cities; the cities and rates shown in 
Table 8 were used because they are the most common cities in which aviators are 
stationed.  
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Table 8.   Projected Navy BAH rates for aviators. Adapted from Defense 
Management Travel Office (2016). 
 
 
e. Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) 
The FY15 ACCP message listed total bonus amounts for aviators as either 
$75,000 or $125,000 (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs), 2015). Calculations were performed with the bonus set at both amounts to 
perform sensitivity analysis.   
f. Tax Incentive 
Naval aviators were given a tax savings during their military careers because both 
BAS and BAH are non-taxed allowances. This fact in conjunction with the fact that 
commercial aviators are not given a tax-free housing allowance means that a 15 percent 
tax savings was given only to BAS and BAH to ensure career earnings were calculated 
correctly and fairly.   
g. Blended Retirement Plan 
The Navy’s new blended retirement plan will consist of CP, DCs and DBs for 
those eligible. 
(1) Continuation Pay (CP) 
The Final Report for the military’s new blended retirement plan released by the 
MCRMC determined that the CP multipliers displayed in Table 9 would be required to 
maintain the current force structure (Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization Commission, 2015). It was also assumed by the MCRMC that each 
service would have flexibility to increase CP to incentivize retention as needed. The 
calculations in this study used a multiplier of 15 for determining career earnings. 
Rank Norfolk, VA Jacksonville, FL San Diego, CA Whidbey Island, WA Average
O-1 1,641.00$ 1,542.00$        2,325.00$     1,206.00$                1,678.50$                
O-2 1,749.00$ 1,764.00$        2,451.00$     1,410.00$                1,843.50$                
O-3 1,860.00$ 1,848.00$        2,706.00$     1,719.00$                2,033.25$                
O-4 2,085.00$ 2,085.00$        2,943.00$     1,938.00$                2,262.75$                
O-5 2,247.00$ 2,259.00$        3,117.00$     2,097.00$                2,430.00$                
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Table 9.   CP multipliers by service. Source: Military Compensation and 
Retirement Modernization Commission (2015). 
 
 
(2) Defined Contributions 
It was assumed that aviators would be financially wise and make a minimum 
contribution of five percent annually to their TSP accounts. Based on the MCRMC 
report, it is assumed that aviators will automatically receive one percent the first four 
years of service and then receive the maximum matching contribution of five percent for 
the remainder of their careers. There is a chance some aviators will invest more but only 
five percent is relevant based upon the governments matching policy.   
It was also necessary to reduce each aviators take home compensation during the 
NPV calculations because they must make a contribution to TSP to receive matching 
funds from the government. This reduction was not made for most of the commercial 
airline retirement contributions because their pilots do not have to make individual 
contributions to their retirement accounts to receive the automatic employer 
contributions. 
(3) Defined Benefits 
It is assumed that aviators eligible for defined benefits will receive a pension 
equivalent to 40 percent of the average pay over the three highest pay periods. This 
assumption is based on them serving 20 years in the Navy and not staying past that point. 
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h. Types of Compensation Left Out 
All the major forms of compensation for naval aviators were included in this 
study but some of the minor ones were left out. All forms of deployment specific 
compensation such as sea pay, hazard duty pay, imminent danger pay, tax free pay, 
family separation pay, per diem, were left out because deployments are not consistent 
among different aviation communities. The command bonus was also left out because it 
requires those who receive it to commit to remain in the service to the 22-year mark, 
which is outside the scope of this study.   
3. Commercial Airline Pilot Compensation 
a. Career Progression 
Airline pilots have unpredictable career promotions. Some of the unpredictability 
is due to individual pilot preferences and some of the unpredictability is due to the needs 
of the airline (Airline Pilot Central, n.d.). For comparison purposes it was necessary to 
make a standard career progression where one does not exist. It was assumed that all 
pilots in this study would have aspirations to promote from FO to captain and this 
promotion would take eight years on average. It was also assumed that all pilots would 
start their careers flying narrow-bodied aircraft and move up to wide-bodied aircraft. 
They would make this transition both as FOs and as captains. For these reasons, the 
monthly pay rates were sequentially stepped up to account for promotions to larger 
aircraft and the promotion to captain. It was also assumed that all airline pilots would fly 
until the mandatory retirement age of 65, which would remain constant. 
b. Airline Specifics 
Calculating career earning while flying for a commercial airline required many 
assumptions to be made regarding the following categories: Minimum flight hours 
guaranteed, average flight hours flown, projected pay raises, retirement fund matching 
and profit sharing rates. Table 10 lists the rates that were used for each category.   
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Delta 65 80 3% 15% 10% 
United 70 80 2.5% 16% 13% 
American 73 80 3% 16% 10% 
Southwest 78 80 3% 9.3% 3% 
FedEx12 74 80 3% 8% 0% 
 
The numbers in Table 10 were used to calculate career earnings but it is extremely 
unlikely these numbers would remain constant over an entire career.   
c. Compensation Left Out 
When calculating career compensation for airline pilots not all forms of income 
were accounted for. Each pilot receives a set hourly rate but those hourly rates can 
actually be slightly higher than what was used in this study. On top of the rates used here, 
pilots also receive per diem which is usually around $2.00/hr domestic and $2.50/hr 
internationally. These were left out because they cannot be accurately accounted for and 
because per diem was not used in the Navy compensation either. Airline pilots can also 
receive International Override Pay when they fly routes which require special 
qualifications. This pay can increase their hourly rate by $4.50/hr for FO’s and $6.50/hr 
for Captains. This was not included because there is no way to accurately determine who 
is receiving it and how often. These are two forms of compensation that all airlines offer 
but other airline specific pays include Ultra Long Range override and night override pays 
(Airline Pilot Central, n.d.). 
4. Calculating Career Earnings 
Career earnings were calculated for two different scenarios. The first scenario 
involves naval aviators who separate after their initial commitment and begin flying for 
the airlines. These aviators will be referred to as veterans. The second scenario involves a 
                                                 
12 FedEx does not have profit sharing and has the lowest retirement fund match but they are the only 
airline to offer a defined benefit pension on top of what is listed above. 
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naval aviator who separates after retirement and begins flying for the airlines. This 
aviator will be referred to as a retiree.   
a. Veteran Career Earnings 
The following components are used to calculate the veteran’s career earnings:  
Navy take home compensation, airline take home compensation and retirement fund.   
1. Navy take home compensation consists of the sum of annual base pay, 
annual flight pay, annual BAS, annual BAH, and tax incentive. Navy take 
home compensation is adjusted annually for inflation and then each year is 
discounted back to age 32 (10 years of service) using the personal discount 
rate and NPV equation.   
2. Airline take home compensation consists of the sum of yearly salary and 
profit sharing and then subtracts annual union dues. Airline take home 
compensation is adjusted annually for inflation and then each year is 
discounted back to age 32 (10 years of service) using the personal discount 
rate and NPV equations. 
3. The retirement fund consists of the TSP account from service in the Navy 
which is then rolled into the airline retirement fund. It is assumed that 
contributions are made to the retirement fund until the age of 65 when the 
veteran retires from the airlines. The value of the retirement fund only 
accounts for employer contributions; employee contributions are 
accounted for in take home compensation. The total value of the 
retirement fund at the age of 65 is discounted back to age 32 (10 years of 
service).    
b. Retiree Career Earnings 
The retiree’s career earnings consist of the same inputs and calculations as the 
veteran but also includes a lifelong pension from the Navy. The pension begins when the 
retirees Navy career ends and airline career begins. The pension is adjusted annually for 
inflation and it is anticipated that it will be received from age 42 until age 85, the 
assumed life expectancy for officers. The annual values are discounted back to age 32 (10 
years of service) using the personal discount rate.13   
                                                 
13 Pilots who are employed by FedEx are also eligible to receive a pension upon retirement from 
FedEx (Airline Pilot Central, n.d.).  This pension is calculated and discounted in the same manner as the 
military pension. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
When performing the calculations for career earnings, results were separated into 
two main categories consisting of naval aviators who fall under the DB retirement plan 
and those who fall under the blended retirement plan. Aviators who enter the service on 
January 1, 2018 or later will fall under the blended plan. Aviators who joined prior to that 
date will fall under the DB plan but have the option to switch to the blended plan if they 
have completed less than 12 years of service.  
A. DEFINED BENEFIT RETIREMENT PLAN 
Naval aviators falling under the DB retirement plan were analyzed based on two 
possible career options in the Navy. One option was to serve until completing their 
ADSO and then separate and join the airlines; these aviators are considered veterans. The 
other option was to serve in the Navy for 20 years and retire. Following retirement, these 
aviators will join the airlines. These aviators are considered retirees.  
1. Inputs to Calculations 
At the age of 32 following roughly 10 years of service, naval aviators have the 
choice to stay in the Navy or separate. The following are the inputs that were used to 
calculate the net present value of these two career options at that time. The inputs listed 
in Tables 11, 12 and 13 are described in detail in Chapter III.   
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Table 11.   Common inputs to all calculations. 
Inflation Rate 2.35% 
Rate of Return 7.30% 
Personal Discount Rate 6.40% 
Table 12.   Navy-specific inputs. 
Projected Annual Pay Raise 1.4% 
ACCP Bonus (total amount) $125,000 
Tax Incentive 15% 
Table 13.   Airline-specific inputs. 
 Southwest Delta American  United FedEx 
401k Automatic 
Contribution 
9.3%14 15% 16% 16% 8% 
Projected Pay 
Raise 
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Avg. Hours 
Flown 
80 80 80 80 80 
Union Dues 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 
Profit Sharing 10% 10% 10% 13% 0% 
Min Hours 
Guaranteed 
78 65 73 70 74 
 
  
                                                 
14 Southwest’s 401k contribution is not automatic, it is a matching contribution that depends on how 
much each pilot contributes (Airline Pilot Central, n.d.). For this study, it is assumed that each pilot will 
ensure the maximum allowable contributions are made. 
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2. NPV Results 
Using the inputs from Tables 11–13, NPVs were calculated and are displayed in 
Table 14. 
Table 14.   NPV results at age 32. 
Age Navy Career Airline NPV 
32 Veteran Southwest $2,417,189.78  
32 Retiree Southwest $2,681,112.13  
32 Veteran American $3,430,938.32  
32 Retiree American $3,092,672.52  
32 Veteran Delta $3,082,557.48  
32 Retiree Delta $2,949,029.08  
32 Veteran United $3,582,646.08  
32 Retiree United $3,159,940.05  
32 Veteran FedEx $3,272,818.90  
32 Retiree FedEx $3,175,558.10  
 
The NPVs represent a present day value for what an aviator could expect to earn 
depending on which career path he or she follows and which airline they chose to fly for. 
It is important to remember that NPV is not the exact amount of money that will be 
earned but instead is an analytic construct. NPV is a tool for comparing different cash 
flows to determine which one is the most profitable if all the assumptions hold true. In 
Table 14, the United/Veteran option proves to be the most valuable followed by 
American/Veteran and FedEx/Veteran. The least valuable option is Southwest/Veteran 
followed by Southwest/Retiree. The big takeaway here is that the veteran option for the 
Navy career is the most profitable and Southwest as a whole (veteran and retiree options) 
is the least profitable.  
The difference between NPV’s for both Navy career options as shown in Table 15 
reveals that if an aviator is making a purely financial decision, it is more valuable to 
separate from the Navy after finishing their initial commitment for all employment 
opportunities except for Southwest. In the case of employment at Southwest, it is 
financially smarter to remain in the Navy until retirement. There is also a clear distinction 
that United and American are above both Delta and FedEx. The reason Delta is ranked 
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lower is mainly due to lower hourly pay rates because Delta shares almost identical 
inputs with United and American. FedEx is lower because of its retirement plan. It offers 
a lower 401k automatic contribution than the others but additionally it offers a DB 
pension the others do not. While this does provide value, there is not any growth with it 
like a 401k and the pilots do not receive it until later in life (age 65) and thus a lot of the 
pension’s value is discounted away with the 6.4 percent personal discount rate. 








Each calculation above was done with the assumption that naval aviators that 
separated as veterans did not serve in the reserves. For those aviators who chose to serve 
in the reserves while flying commercially, they can expect an increase in their NPV at the 
age of 32 of $96,510.18. Table 16 reveals the effects of this increase when comparing the 
difference in NPV between veterans and retirees. 
Table 16.   Veteran NPV with Reserve Service minus Retiree NPV. 
Airline Amount 
SW ($167,412.17) 
Delta $230,038.59  
United $519,216.21  
American $434,775.98  
FedEx $193,770.98  
 
Adding the reserve component to the calculation only serves to increase the 
difference between NPVs for veterans over retirees. Again, for those seeking 
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employment with Southwest it is still smarter to remain in the Navy until retirement but 
the gap is not as large as it is for those who do not continue to serve in the reserves.   
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The results above are all dependent on the inputs remaining fixed which is highly 
unlikely. Adjusting some of the inputs up and down determined how much flexibility 
there was in the results and helped determine which inputs influence NPV the most. 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on all of the common inputs as well as the ACCP 
bonus. With the sensitivity analysis conducted in this study, it is important to note that 
only one variable was changed at a time and all others were kept constant.   
a. ACCP 
The initial calculations used a total value of $125,000 for the bonus based on the 
fact that $25,000 was the maximum amount allowed by congress to be paid out per year. 
There is speculation that the amount may be raised to $35,000 per year and that is 
analyzed in Table 17 along with some other common bonus amounts used in the past.   
Table 17.   Effect of ACCP on difference in NPV. 
 
 
For Southwest, as the total bonus is increased, the difference between NPV for 
veterans and NPV for retirees grows more and more negative. In this case, if the bonus 
was set at $75,000, a naval aviator who separated as a veteran would lose out on roughly 
$223,000 when compared to the aviator who stayed in until retirement.   
When looking at the other airlines the trend shown is that as the total bonus 
amount increases in $25,000 increments, the NPV difference drops by roughly $20,000. 
Overall, though, it is still more advantageous for aviators to leave after completing their 
Total Bonus SW Delta American United FedEx
75,000.00$    (223,232.39)$   174,218.37$     378,955.76$   463,396.00$   137,950.77$   
100,000.00$  (243,577.37)$   153,873.39$     358,610.78$   443,051.01$   117,605.79$   
125,000.00$  (263,922.35)$   133,528.41$     338,265.79$   422,706.03$   97,260.80$     
150,000.00$  (284,267.33)$   113,183.42$     317,920.81$   402,361.05$   76,915.82$     
175,000.00$  (304,612.32)$   92,838.44$       297,575.83$   382,016.07$   56,570.84$     
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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ADSO but a larger bonus can go a long way in closing the gap, especially for FedEx and 
Delta.   
Although it was assumed that only one variable would change at a time, the true 
value of the bonus is most closely linked to personal discount rate. The table above was 
derived using a 6.4 percent discount rate that is assumed for senior officers. Enlisted 
members tend to have higher discount rates around 10 percent and above (Military 
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, 2015). If the $175,000 bonus 
is analyzed with a 10 percent discount rate, the differences in NPV are almost 50 percent 
lower (United’s NPV difference would be roughly $194,000). This important to note 
because increasing bonuses could be more valuable than what is assumed.  
b. Inflation 
In the original calculations, inflation was set at 2.35 percent. The analysis in Table 
18 shows that if the inflation rate drops, there will be a larger difference between a 
veteran’s NPV and a retirees NPV, meaning it is even more advantageous to separate 
from the Navy earlier. The opposite holds true as inflation rates rise, however even at 3.5 
percent it is still more advantageous to separate early, except for employment with 
Southwest and FedEx. For comparison purposes, Figure 3 shows historical inflations 
rates in the United States over the past 10 years. Southwest, Delta and FedEx all have a 
negative difference in NPV when inflation reaches four percent and above, a number that 
has not been reached since 2009. 
Table 18.   Effect of inflation on difference in NPV. 
 
Inflation Rate SW Delta United American FedEx
1.0% (173,701.22)$   227,370.63$     519,666.29$   434,180.75$   191,120.74$   
1.5% (204,112.47)$   195,618.24$     486,759.07$   401,660.68$   159,346.60$   
2.0% (237,948.03)$   160,441.53$     450,427.54$   365,716.30$   124,165.78$   
2.5% (275,683.62)$   121,364.79$     410,195.97$   325,871.87$   85,103.57$     
3.0% (317,867.05)$   77,840.22$       365,516.57$   281,579.63$   41,613.33$     
3.5% (365,129.44)$   29,236.68$       315,758.20$   232,208.41$   (6,934.92)$      
4.0% (418,198.45)$   (25,173.48)$      260,193.22$   177,030.57$   (61,267.58)$    
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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Figure 3.  Historical U.S. inflation rates. Source: Trading Economics (2016). 
c. Rate of Return 
If Southwest is removed from consideration, Table 19 reveals that returns of five 
percent and above will make it more profitable to leave after ADSO rather than wait until 
retirement. If returns are projected to be below five percent, employment with Delta and 
FedEx would be more profitable after retirement from the Navy while United and 
American would continue to remain more profitable after the ADSO. 
Table 19.   Effect of return rate on difference in NPV. 
 
Rate of Return SW Delta United American FedEx
3% (369,899.02)$   (52,116.30)$      200,103.60$   120,296.17$   (19,370.06)$    
4% (354,317.64)$   (24,624.52)$      233,010.78$   152,490.54$   (2,230.98)$      
5% (334,294.06)$   10,561.46$       275,160.13$   193,745.80$   19,792.65$     
6% (308,572.47)$   55,603.61$       329,165.13$   246,627.84$   48,093.00$     
7% (275,547.20)$   113,265.07$     398,369.93$   314,420.59$   84,454.30$     
8% (233,167.11)$   187,074.22$     487,049.68$   401,322.99$   131,160.96$   
9% (178,814.70)$   281,532.45$     600,664.24$   512,698.55$   191,134.78$   
10% (109,153.00)$   402,377.07$     746,179.46$   655,391.29$   268,108.71$   
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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d. Personal Discount Rate 
In the original calculations, the personal discount rate was set at 6.4 percent. This 
number was used by RAND when they analyzed the new retirement system. They 
determined that officers typically valued one dollar tomorrow at 94 cents today, thus a 
discount rate of roughly six percent. What this is assuming is that all officers are the same 
with regards to how they value money in the present and in the future which is far from 
realistic. Table 20 allows an aviator to understand the impact on NPV if they have a 
personal discount rate that is higher or lower than 6.4 percent. If an aviator believes their 
personal discount rate is lower they will find the difference in NPV’s between veterans 
and retirees to increase which would make it even more valuable to separate earlier. The 
opposite holds true if they determine their personal discount rate to be greater than 6.4 
percent. 
Table 20.   Effect of personal discount rate on difference in NPV. 
 
 
B. BLENDED RETIREMENT PLAN 
Naval aviators falling under the blended retirement plan were analyzed based on 
the same two possible career options as those under the DB plan. The first option was to 
serve until completing their ADSO and then separate and join the airlines; these aviators 
are considered veterans. The second option was to serve in the Navy for 20 years and 
retire. Following retirement, these aviators will join the airlines. These aviators are 
considered retirees. The tables below will show the inputs for the calculations along with 
the results broken down by each airline. 
Discount Rate SW Delta United American FedEx
3% (602,348.26)$   200,079.37$     702,814.83$   578,219.32$   (48,284.71)$    
4% (445,163.32)$   196,327.48$     615,435.89$   505,240.19$   35,497.00$     
5% (345,749.75)$   174,444.99$     529,627.05$   431,459.25$   77,283.18$     
6% (282,378.70)$   145,600.35$     451,362.82$   363,320.37$   94,643.33$     
7% (241,640.92)$   115,583.43$     382,679.69$   303,225.69$   98,059.20$     
8% (215,203.59)$   87,203.22$       323,661.28$   251,545.43$   93,771.83$     
9% (197,852.41)$   61,649.76$       273,508.85$   207,706.90$   85,479.08$     
10% (186,301.84)$   39,262.02$       231,102.60$   170,769.70$   75,351.82$     
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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1. Inputs to Calculations 
At the age of 32 following roughly 10 years of service, naval aviators have the 
choice to stay in the Navy or separate. The following are the inputs that were used to 
calculate the NPV of these two career options at that time. The inputs in Table 21 and 23 
are the same as they were in Table 11 and 13 in the defined benefit section. Table 22 has 
additional inputs when compared to Table 12 because of the matching TSP account. The 
government will match up to a maximum of five percent and it is assumed that all 
aviators will contribute that amount to maximize the government’s contribution. The 
contribution factor is also new because contribution pay was not a part of the DB 
retirement plan.   
Table 21.   Common inputs to all calculations. 
Inflation Rate 2.35% 
Rate of Return 7.30% 
Personal Discount Rate 6.40% 
Table 22.   Navy-specific inputs. 
Projected Annual Pay Raise 1.4% 
ACCP Bonus (total amount) $125,000 
Tax Incentive 15% 
Gov’t TSP Automatic Contribution  1% 
Member TSP Contribution 5% 
Gov’t TSP Match (Years 5 and after) 4% 
Continuation Pay Factor 14 
 
For TSP accounts, the government will automatically contribute one percent 
every year regardless of what is contributed by the aviator. After completing four years of 
service, the government will begin to match TSP contributions. The total that can be 
contributed from the government through auto contributions and matching is five percent. 
To get that five percent maximum, aviators must contribute five percent themselves at 
which point the government will match at a rate of four percent and still make the 
automatic contribution of one percent for a total government contribution of five percent.   
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Table 23.   Airline-specific inputs. 
 Southwest Delta American  United FedEx 
401k Automatic 
Contribution 
9.3%15 15% 16% 16% 8% 
Projected  
Pay Raise 
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Average 
Hours Flown 
80 80 80 80 80 
Union Dues 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 
Profit Sharing 10% 10% 10% 13% 0% 
Minimum  
Hours Guaranteed 
78 65 73 70 74 
 
2. NPV Results 
Using inputs from Tables 21, 22 and 23, NPVs were calculated and are displayed 
as described in Table 24 and the remainder of this section. 
Table 24.   NPV results at age 32. 
Age Navy Career Airline NPV 
32 Veteran Southwest $2,510,639.20  
32 Retiree Southwest $2,805,258.37   
32 Veteran American $3,524,387.74  
32 Retiree American $3,216,818.76  
32 Veteran Delta $3,176,006.90  
32 Retiree Delta $3,073,175.32  
32 Veteran United $3,676,095.50  
32 Retiree United $3,284,086.29  
32 Veteran FedEx $3,366,268.32  
32 Retiree FedEx $3,299,704.34  
 
The NPVs represent a present-day value for what an aviator could expect to earn 
depending on which career path they follow and which airline they chose to fly for. It is 
important to remember that NPV is not the exact amount of money that will be earned but 
                                                 
15 Southwest’s 401k contribution is not automatic, it is a matching contribution that depends on how 
much each pilot contributes (Airline Pilot Central, n.d.).  For this study, it is assumed that each pilot will 
ensure the match gets maximized. 
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instead it is an analytic construct. NPV is a tool for comparing different cash flows to 
determine which one is the most profitable if all the assumptions hold true. In Table 24, 
the United/Veteran option proves to be the most valuable followed by American/Veteran 
and FedEx/Veteran (these results match the results from the defined benefit section). The 
least valuable option is Southwest/Veteran followed by Southwest/Retiree. The big 
takeaway here is that the veteran option for the Navy career is the most profitable and 
Southwest as a whole (veteran and retiree options) is the least profitable.   
The difference between NPV’s for both Navy career options as shown in Table 25 
reveals that if an aviator is making a purely financial decision, it is more valuable to 
separate from the Navy after finishing their initial commitment for all employment 
opportunities except for Southwest. In the case of employment at Southwest, it is 
financially smarter to remain in the Navy until retirement. It is clear when looking at the 
values though that the new blended retirement plan does decrease the difference in 
NPV’s. The new difference in NPV is now almost $30,000 lower meaning the career 
earnings for retirees is now closer to veterans.  
Table 25.   Veteran NPV minus Retiree NPV. 
Airline Amount 
SW ($294,619.17) 
Delta $102,831.58  
United $392,009.21  
American $307,568.97  
FedEx $66,563.98  
 
Each calculation was done with the assumption that naval aviators that separated 
as veterans did not serve in the reserves. For those aviators who chose to serve in the 
reserves while flying commercially, they can expect an increase in their NPV at the age 
of 32 of $96,510.18. Table 26 reveals the effects of this increase when comparing the 
difference in NPV between veterans and retirees. 
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Table 26.   Veteran NPV with Reserve Service minus Retiree NPV. 
Airline Amount 
SW  $(198,108.99) 
Delta  $199,341.76  
United  $488,519.39  
American  $404,079.15  
FedEx  $163,074.16  
 
Adding the reserve component to the calculation only serves to increase the 
difference between NPV’s for veterans over retirees. Again, for those seeking 
employment with Southwest it is still smarter to remain in the Navy until retirement but 
the gap is not as large as it is for those who do not continue to serve in the reserves.   
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted the same way for the blended retirement plan 
as it was for the defined benefit plan. The only difference is that the CP factor is analyzed 
along with all of the factors previously analyzed. 
a. ACCP 
ACCP again follows the same trend that for every $25,000 increase the NPV 
difference decreases by roughly $20,000 as shown in Table 27. For those seeking 
employment at United or American, raises to the bonus are not nearly as significant as it 
is for those considering Delta or FedEx. It is again important to point out the relationship 
between bonuses and personal discount rates. A bonus of $175,000 combined with a 
discount rate of 10 percent would yield negative NPV differences for Southwest, Delta 
and FedEx and it would bring United’s NPV difference down to $138,764.27.   
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In the original calculations, inflation was set at 2.35 percent. Table 28 shows that 
if the inflation rate drops, there will be a larger difference between a veteran’s NPV and a 
retiree’s NPV, meaning it is even more advantageous to separate from the Navy earlier. 
The opposite holds true as inflation rates rise, however even at 3.5 percent it is still more 
advantageous to separate early, except for employment with Southwest and FedEx.   
Table 28.   Effect of inflation on difference in NPV. 
 
 
c. Rate of Return 
The analysis in Table 29 reveals that for United, American and FedEx, if the rate 
of return is greater than three percent then it is advantageous to separate after completing 
ADSO. For Delta, a return rate of five percent or greater is required to make it more 
advantageous to separate earlier. It is important to note that the return rate does not 
impact FedEx’s NPV difference as much as it does for the other airlines. This is a result 
Total Bonus SW Delta United American FedEx
75,000.00$      (253,929.21)$   143,521.55$    432,699.18$   348,258.94$    107,253.95$    
100,000.00$    (274,274.19)$   123,176.57$    412,354.19$   327,913.96$    86,908.96$      
125,000.00$    (294,619.17)$   102,831.58$    392,009.21$   307,568.97$    66,563.98$      
150,000.00$    (314,964.16)$   82,486.60$      371,664.23$   287,223.99$    46,219.00$      
175,000.00$    (335,309.14)$   62,141.62$      351,319.25$   266,879.01$    25,874.02$      
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
Inflation Rate SW Delta United American FedEx
1.0% (222,880.25)$   178,191.61$     470,487.26$   385,001.73$   141,941.71$    
1.5% (247,047.03)$   152,683.67$     443,824.50$   358,726.12$   116,412.04$    
2.0% (273,953.26)$   124,436.30$     414,422.30$   329,711.06$   88,160.54$      
2.5% (303,979.53)$   93,068.89$       381,900.07$   297,575.97$   56,807.67$      
3.0% (337,564.05)$   58,143.22$       345,819.57$   261,882.62$   21,916.33$      
3.5% (375,211.75)$   19,154.37$       305,675.90$   222,126.10$   (17,017.23)$     
4.0% (417,504.74)$   (24,479.78)$      260,886.93$   177,724.28$   (60,573.88)$     
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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of their lower automatic contribution to their 401ks (8 percent instead of the 16 percent 
that most of the others receive).  
Table 29.   Effect of return rate on difference in NPV. 
 
 
d. Personal Discount Rate 
In the original calculations, the personal discount rate was set at 6.4 percent. This 
number was used by RAND when they analyzed the new retirement system. RAND 
determined that officers typically valued one dollar tomorrow at roughly 94 cents today, 
thus a discount rate of 6.4 percent. What this is assuming is that all officers are the same 
with regards to how the value money in the present and in the future which is far from 
realistic. Table 30, allows an aviator to understand the impact on NPV if he or she has a 
personal discount rate that is higher or lower than 6.4 percent. If an aviator believes his or 
her personal discount rate is lower, he or she will find the difference in NPV’s between 
veterans and retirees to increase which would make it even more valuable to separate 
earlier. The opposite holds true if he or she determines his or her personal discount rate to 
be greater than 6.4 percent.   
Return Rate SW Delta United American FedEx
3.0% (339,430.13)$   (21,647.40)$      230,572.49$   150,765.06$   11,098.84$      
4.0% (332,554.83)$   (2,861.71)$        254,773.59$   174,253.35$   19,531.83$      
5.0% (323,913.78)$   20,941.73$       285,540.41$   204,126.08$   30,172.92$      
6.0% (313,047.05)$   51,129.03$       324,690.55$   242,153.25$   43,618.42$      
7.0% (299,373.62)$   89,438.65$       374,543.51$   290,594.17$   60,627.88$      
8.0% (282,159.27)$   138,082.06$     438,057.52$   352,330.83$   82,168.80$      
9.0% (260,476.19)$   199,870.96$     519,002.75$   431,037.06$   109,473.29$    
10.0% (233,151.75)$   278,378.32$     622,180.70$   531,392.53$   144,109.96$    
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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Table 30.   Effect of personal discount rate on difference in NPV. 
 
 
e. Continuation Pay Factor 
The CP factor is multiplied by one month of base pay to determine the bonus 
given for continued service in the Navy. A factor of two increases the bonus received by 
roughly $14,000 while it relates to a NPV change of roughly $12,000 as shown in Table 
31. The end result is as the CP factor increases, the NPV difference will decrease 
bringing the NPV of a retiree closer to that of a veteran. The maximum CP of 22 will not 
make much of a difference for potential employees of United and American but a 
maximum CP of 22 can make a difference with Delta and FedEx if a high enough factor 
is used. Regardless of what the CP factor is, the difference in NPV is always greatest for 
United and then followed by American, Delta, FedEx and then Southwest.   
Table 31.   Effect of CP factor on difference in NPV. 
 
 
Discount Rate SW Delta United American FedEx
3.0% (637,859.67)$   164,567.97$     667,303.42$   542,707.91$   (83,796.12)$     
4.0% (480,022.57)$   161,468.23$     580,576.65$   470,380.94$   637.75$           
5.0% (378,838.57)$   141,356.17$     496,538.23$   398,370.43$   44,194.36$      
6.0% (313,683.95)$   114,295.10$     420,057.57$   332,015.12$   63,338.08$      
7.0% (271,573.78)$   85,650.57$       352,746.83$   273,292.84$   68,126.35$      
8.0% (244,269.60)$   58,137.20$       294,595.26$   222,479.42$   64,705.81$      
9.0% (226,506.26)$   32,995.91$       244,854.99$   179,053.05$   56,825.22$      
10.0% (214,896.10)$   10,667.76$       202,508.35$   142,175.44$   46,757.57$      
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
CP Factor SW Delta United American FedEx
8 (259,694.60)$   137,756.16$     426,933.79$   342,493.55$   101,488.56$    
10 (271,336.12)$   126,114.64$     415,292.26$   330,852.03$   89,847.03$      
12 (282,977.65)$   114,473.11$     403,650.74$   319,210.50$   78,205.51$      
14 (294,619.17)$   102,831.58$     392,009.21$   307,568.97$   66,563.98$      
16 (306,260.70)$   91,190.06$       380,367.68$   295,927.45$   54,922.46$      
18 (317,902.22)$   79,548.53$       368,726.16$   284,285.92$   43,280.93$      
20 (329,543.75)$   67,907.01$       357,084.63$   272,644.40$   31,639.40$      
22 (341,185.28)$   56,265.48$       345,443.11$   261,002.87$   19,997.88$      
Difference in NPV (Veteran - Retiree)
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C. ALTERNATIVE ACCP PLAN 
An effective way to shrink the gap in the NPV difference between veterans and 
retirees is to redesign the Navy’s ACCP program. As it currently stands, the Navy’s 
ACCP program only incentivizes aviators to complete their department head tours. An 
alternative would be to incentivize aviators to compete for a command tour while being 
financially rewarded for completing it. One of the downsides ACCP as it is currently 
implemented is the potential for a pay inversion. This can lead to DHs being paid more 
than the executive officer because they are potentially receiving a $25,000 annual bonus 
while the upper chain of command is no longer receiving a bonus. The alternative ACCP 
plan studied here would remove this pay inversion by paying aviators bonuses through 
the completion of their command tour. The following are proposed guidelines for an 
alternative plan: 
• Aviators become eligible to apply for ACCP once selected for O-4. 
• Aviators will receive annual ACCP bonus installments until completion of 
command tour. 
• Aviators will only receive annual installments if they continue to reach 
aviation related career milestones. Once an aviator fails to meet a 
milestone (DH screen, O-5 promotion, command screen) they will stop 
receiving their annual installment. 
• Following command tours, a new ACCP plan will need to be formulated 
to ensure naval aviation retains its most talented and experienced aviators. 
(This is outside the scope of this thesis but would be required)   
The following are two proposals for alternative ACCP plans and how much they 
would cost the Navy. It is also important to note that the ACCP program includes NFOs 
as well as pilots so they will both be considered in the following two proposals despite 
the fact that the main focus of this study is on pilots. The proposals will break up all 
aviators into three groups: NFOs, rotary-wing pilots (RWP) and fixed-wing pilots (FWP). 
1. Proposal 1   
In this proposal, all three groups of aviators will be paid the same annual bonus of 
$25,000. For those aviators that hit all their milestones and complete a command tour, 
they will earn $225,000 over nine years as shown in Table 32.   
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Table 32.   Bonus payments under Proposal 1. 
Year of 
Service 
Rank Milestone Annual Payment  
10 O-3 O-4 Select  $         25,000.00   
11 O-4 DH Select  $         25,000.00   
12 O-4 DH    $         25,000.00   
13 O-4 DH  $         25,000.00   
14 O-4 DH  $         25,000.00   
15 O-4 Post DH  $         25,000.00   
16 O-4 O-5/CMD Select  $         25,000.00   
17 O-5 XO  $         25,000.00   
18 O-5 CO  $         25,000.00   
  Total Payment  $       225,000.00 If all milestones are met 
 
For those aviators that intend to stay in the Navy until retirement, Proposal 1 
would have the following impact on NPV as shown in Table 33. 
Table 33.   Effect of Proposal 1 on NPV. 













under Proposal 1 
(Blended 
retirement) 
SW ($263,922.35) ($311,422.95) ($294,619.17) ($342,119.77) 
Delta $133,528.41 $86,027.81  $102,831.58  $55,330.99  
United $422,706.03 $375,205.44  $392,009.21  $344,508.62  
American $338,265.79 $290,765.20  $307,568.97  $260,068.38  
FedEx $97,260.80 $49,760.21  $66,563.98  $19,063.39  
 
Proposal 1 would shrink the NPV difference between veterans and retirees by 
roughly $48,000 which would make the Navy career option much more comparable for 
pilots who are considering employment with Delta and FedEx.   
2. Proposal 2 
In proposal 2, the three groups of aviators would not be paid the same. FWP’s 
would be paid the highest amount each year based on their value to the commercial 
aviation sector. This means they would receive an annual bonus of $30,000 for a total of 
                                                 
16 Current ACCP assumes $125,000 total bonus. 
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$270,000 over nine years if they meet all career milestones. RWP’s and NFO’s would 
each receive $20,000 per year and a total of $180,000 over nine years if they reach all 
career milestones. Table 34 shows what the payments would look like over the course of 
a career. 
Table 34.   Bonus payments under Proposal 2. 
Year of 
Service 






10 O-3 O-4 Select  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
11 O-4 DH Select  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
12 O-4 DH    $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
13 O-4 DH  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
14 O-4 DH  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
15 O-4 Post DH  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
16 O-4 O-5/CMD Select  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
17 O-5 XO  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
18 O-5 CO  $      30,000.00   $      20,000.00   $      20,000.00  
  Total Payment  $      270,000.00  $      180,000.00  $      180,000.00 
 
For those aviators that intend to stay in the Navy until retirement, Proposal 2 
would have the following impact on NPV as shown in Table 35. 
Table 35.   Effect of Proposal 2 on NPV. 













under Proposal 2 
(Blended 
retirement) 
SW ($263,922.35) ($341,268.05) ($294,619.17) ($371,964.87) 
Delta $133,528.41 $56,182.71  $102,831.58  $25,485.89  
United $422,706.03 $345,360.34  $392,009.21  $314,663.51  
American $338,265.79 $260,920.10  $307,568.97  $230,223.28  
FedEx $97,260.80 $19,915.11  $66,563.98  ($10,781.71) 
 
                                                 
17 Current ACCP assumes $125,000 total bonus. 
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Proposal 2 would shrink the NPV difference between veterans and retirees by 
roughly $77,000 which would make the Navy career option much more comparable for 
pilots who are considering employment with Delta and FedEx.   
3. Cost of Proposals 
There is a cost associated with making the Navy’s compensation for aviators more 
comparable to the airlines. The current ACCP plan is projected to cost the Navy $33.2 
million in FY17, $35.3 million in FY18, $36.9 million in FY19 and $38.2 million in 
FY20. (Department of the Navy, 2015). To determine the cost of Proposal 1, data from 
FY13 through FY16 was compiled in Table 36 to determine the average number of 
FWPs, RWPs and NFOs to hit each milestone and break them into percentages. 
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Table 36.   Aviation milestone data by aviation groups. Adapted from Navy Personnel Command (2016), Navy Personnel 
Command (n.d.a). 
 
O-4 Selects DH Sels O-5 Sels CMD Sels 
  FWP RWP NFO FWP RWP NFO FWP RWP NFO FWP RWP NFO 
Average 180 147 101 123 100 81 95 77 69 59 37 33 
Percentage 42% 34% 24% 40% 33% 27% 39% 32% 29% 46% 29% 26% 
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Using the data from Table 36, cost for Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 are listed in 
Table 37 and Table 38, respectively. 
Table 37.   Cost of Proposal 1. 
Year of 
Service 
Rank Milestone Total 
Personnel 
Yearly Payment Total Paid 
 
10 O-3 O-4 Select 428  $         25,000.00   $  10,700,000.00  
11 O-4 DH Select 304  $         25,000.00   $    7,600,000.00  
12 O-4 DH   304  $         25,000.00   $    7,600,000.00  
13 O-4 DH 304  $         25,000.00   $    7,600,000.00  
14 O-4 DH 304  $         25,000.00   $    7,600,000.00  
15 O-4 Post DH 304  $         25,000.00   $    7,600,000.00  
16 O-4 O-5/CMD Select 241  $         25,000.00   $    6,025,000.00  
17 O-5 XO 129  $         25,000.00   $    3,225,000.00  
18 O-5 CO 129  $         25,000.00   $    3,225,000.00  
  TOTAL PAID   $       225,000.00 $  61,175,000.00  
Table 38.   Cost of Proposal 2. 
 
 
At roughly $61 million, the Navy would have to be prepared to spend about $25 
million more annually on ACCP than they are currently spending to implement Proposal 
1. Implementing Proposal 2 would cost roughly $59 million and would actually save the 
Navy $2 million when compared to Proposal 1. Both Proposal 1 and 2 provide flexibility 
to change the yearly payments per group (NFO, RWP and FWP) based on retention 


















10 O-3 O-4 Sel 428 24% $20,000 2,054,400.00$    34% $20,000 2,910,400.00$    42% $30,000 5,392,800.00$    
11 O-4 DH Sel 304 27% $20,000 1,641,600.00$    33% $20,000 2,006,400.00$    40% $30,000 3,648,000.00$    
12 O-4 DH  304 27% $20,000 1,641,600.00$    33% $20,000 2,006,400.00$    40% $30,000 3,648,000.00$    
13 O-4 DH 304 27% $20,000 1,641,600.00$    33% $20,000 2,006,400.00$    40% $30,000 3,648,000.00$    
14 O-4 DH 304 27% $20,000 1,641,600.00$    33% $20,000 2,006,400.00$    40% $30,000 3,648,000.00$    
15 O-4 Post DH 304 27% $20,000 1,641,600.00$    33% $20,000 2,006,400.00$    40% $30,000 3,648,000.00$    
16 O-4 O-5/CMD S 241 29% $20,000 1,397,800.00$    32% $20,000 1,542,400.00$    39% $30,000 2,819,700.00$    
17 O-5 XO 129 26% $20,000 670,800.00$        29% $20,000 748,200.00$        46% $30,000 1,780,200.00$    
18 O-5 CO 129 26% $20,000 670,800.00$        29% $20,000 748,200.00$        46% $30,000 1,780,200.00$    
180,000.00$ 180,000.00$    270,000.00$  
13,001,800.00$  15,981,200.00$  30,012,900.00$  
58,995,900.00$  
Possible Earnings Per Group
Total Paid Pers Group
Total Paid to All Groups
NFO's Rotary Pilots Fixed Wing Pilots
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The results in Chapter IV revealed that there is a significant difference in NPV 
depending on when an aviator separates from the Navy. The difference in NPV is also 
dependent on the type of carrier that is being discussed. Of the five airlines studied, all 
the legacy and cargo airlines (Delta, United, American and FedEx) had a positive 
difference in NPV meaning it was financially wise for aviators desiring to fly for them to 
separate after their ADSO is up and not stay in the Navy until retirement. Southwest was 
the only major airline analyzed and they were also the only one with a negative NPV 
which meant that is was a better to stay in the Navy until retirement and then seek 
employment with them. It is important to note that Southwest is considered the biggest 
and best compensating of all the major airlines which includes others such as JetBlue, 
Frontier, Spirit and Virgin. This allows us to draw the conclusion that unless employment 
will be gained with Delta, United, American or FedEx,18 it will be better financially to 
remain in the Navy until retirement before seeking to transition.  
In Chapter II, prospective airline hiring trends were discussed. The GAO report 
(2015) cited projected the hiring of approximately 1,900 new pilots and this was the low 
end of the spectrum. Currently, the five airlines analyzed in this study are projected to 
hire a combined 2,500 new pilots in 2016. Southwest, the only airline that consistently 
had a negative NPV difference is only projected to hire 616 new pilots which means the 
other 75% of hires will go to airlines that had positive NPV differences (Future and 
Active Pilot Advisors (FAPA)). This ratio is significant because on financial terms, the 
Navy simply cannot compete with the airlines projected to hire the majority of the new 
pilots in 2016.   
The good news for the Navy is that the implementation of the new retirement plan 
in 2018 will actually lower the NPV differences by roughly $31,000. This decrease will 
                                                 
18 UPS was not studied but they could be considered part of this list as the offer a similar 
compensation package to FedEx. 
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not be significant when looking at United and American because of how large the NPV 
difference is for these two airlines but Delta and FedEx have much smaller NPV 
differences and if the Navy could increase compensation, the decision to separate for 
purely financial reasons would not be so obvious. 
At the end of Chapter IV, two ACCP proposals were laid out as ways to 
potentially shrink the NPV differences even more. If either one was implemented they 
would indeed achieve that desired effect. Both proposals would do a good job or leveling 
the financial playing field with respect to Delta and FedEx. Southwest is not a factor as 
they had a negative NPV difference from the beginning and both United and American 
are in a league that the Navy is not able to compete in.   
One factor to consider when looking at the cost to implement a new ACCP plan is 
the cost to train an aviator. The average cost to train aviators was almost $2 million per 
aviator in 2008, with jet pilot training costing almost $3.3 million (Daly et al., 2008). If 
retention rates fell low enough that the Navy needed to send more pilots through flight 
school each year, the additional $25 million expense to implement a new ACCP plan 
would only cover the expenses of about 12 more aviators which would not produce a 
significant change to retention rates.  
The Navy is now left with a major decision to make. They need to decide if it is 
worth the money to implement a better paying ACCP to attempt to compete in a 
competition they can never fully win. The only thing the Navy cannot afford to do is to 
take no action. Failure to address this potential problem now while the Navy can stay in 
front of it could have disastrous results. One or two years of low retention rates would not 
only impact future command boards but it would also impact the future choices being 
made by aviators still in their first sea tours. Low retention rates could lead to selection of 
department heads who are less than qualified. DHs of this caliber are usually not good 
leaders or aviators yet they have significant responsibilities in molding first tour officers 
into the future leaders of the Navy. This underscores the significance of the Navy staying 
ahead of this problem and getting it right. 
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B. FUTURE STUDY 
Two main areas that are outside the scope of this thesis could be studied. The first 
is the impact of a redesigned ACCP program like the ones proposed here. Retention 
studies have been conducted in the past but never with a totally different plan to propose. 
A retention study with very specific questions about bonuses and also questions that 
would help to determine personal discount rates would prove extremely valuable if the 
Navy attempts to implement a new ACCP plan. The other topic of future study would be 
centered on risk. Risk is at the center of the decision to stay in the Navy or to separate. 
While the Navy does a great job at publishing lesson learned after each selection board or 
screen board, there is a great deal that is unknown about the airlines and how much risk is 
involved in that career path. Both of these are worth a deeper look and would be very 
beneficial to the Navy and the aviators trying to make an informed decision. 
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